382 THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT bk. vi

dominant part in the nineteenth century, and mightagain, that is germane to this discussion.

I have pointed out in the preceding chapter that,under the system of domestic laissez-faire and an inter-national gold standard such as was orthodox in thelatter half of the nineteenth century, there was nomeans open to a government whereby to mitigateeconomic distress at home except through the com-petitive struggle for markets. For all measures helpfulto a state of chronic or intermittent under-employmentwere ruled out, except measures to improve the balanceof trade on income account.

Thus, whilst economists were accustomed to applaudthe prevailing international system as furnishing thefruits of the international division of labour and har-monising at the same time the interests of differentnations, there lay concealed a less benign influence;and those statesmen were moved by common sense anda correct apprehension of the true course of events,who believed that if a rich, old country were to neglectthe struggle for markets its prosperity would droopand fail. But if nations can learn to provide themselveswith full employment by their domestic policy (and,we must add, if they can also attain equilibrium inthe trend of their population), there need be no im-portant economic forces calculated to set the interestof one country against that of its neighbours. Therewould still be room for the international division oflabour and for international lending in appropriateconditions. But there would no longer be a pressingmotive why one country need force its wares on anotheror repulse the offerings of its neighbour, not becausethis was necessary to enable it to pay for what it wishedto purchase, but with the express object of upsettingthe equilibrium of payments so as to develop a balanceof trade in its own favour. International trade wouldcease to be what it is, namely, a desperate expedient tomaintain employment at home by forcing sales on foreign