ESSAYS IN PERSUASION

PART

64

my criticism of the Balfour Note. The aboveis what would happen if the Dawes Scheme isperfectly successful. If the Dawes Scheme isonly partly successful, then, by the principle ofthe Balfour Note, France must make good thedifference to ourselves and the United States. For example, if the Dawes Scheme produceshalf its maximum, which, in the opinion ofmany good judges, would be a considerableachievement, France will get less than nothingat all and more than the whole of Germany ’s pay-ments will go to the United States. France would become, in fact, a deferred claimant ona third share of the Dawes Scheme, if the Schemeworks very well, and a guarantor of Germany, if it works less well. Is not any one very sillywho thinks that this can come to pass?

It is obvious that France will never agree tosuch a settlement. But suppose -per impossihilethat she did. In this case Great Britain and theUnited States have, theoretically, no furtherinterest whatever in the operation or product-ivity of the Dawes Scheme. France becomesthe only interested party,—interested not merelyas a creditor but as a guarantor who must makedeficiencies good.

This fatal objection is necessarily inherent inthe Balfour Note. It is of the essence of theNote that the less Germany pays, the moreFrance shall pay;—that is to say, the less France is in a position to pay, the more she shall pay.Diplomatically and financially alike, this istopsy-turvy. It would never bring us cash;