CH. in THE CONFERENCE 25

them, in the first months of 1919, the microcosm ofmankind.

In those parts of the Treaty with which I amhere concerned, the lead was taken by the French,in the sense that it was generally they who made inthe first instance the most definite and the mostextreme proposals. This was partly a matter oftactics. When the final result is expected to be acompromise, it is often prudent to start from anextreme position; and the French anticipated atthe outset—like most other persons—a double pro-cess of compromise, first of all to suit the ideas oftheir allies and associates, and secondly in thecourse of the Peace Conference proper with theGermans themselves. These tactics were justifiedby the event. Clemenceau gained a reputationfor moderation with his colleagues in Council bysometimes throwing over with an air of intellectualimpartiality the more extreme proposals of hisministers; and much went through where theAmerican and British critics were naturally a littleignorant of the true point at issue, or where toopersistent criticism by France's allies put them ina position which they felt as invidious, of alwaysappearing to take the enemy's part and to arguehis case. Where, therefore, British and Americaninterests were not seriously involved their criticismgrew slack, and some provisions were thus passedwhich the French themselves did not take very