32 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE ch.

have the effect of shortening the interval ofGermany 's recovery and hastening the day whenshe will once again hurl at France her greaternumbers and her superior resources and technicalskill. Hence the necessity of " guarantees " ; andeach guarantee that was taken, by increasing irrita-tion and thus the probability of a subsequentRevanche by Germany , made necessary yet furtherprovisions to crush. Thus, as soon as this viewof the world is adopted and the other discarded, ademand for a Carthaginian Peace is inevitable, tothe full extent of the momentary power to imposeit. For Clemenceau made no pretence of consider-ing himself' bound by the Fourteen Points and leftchiefly to others such concoctions as were necessaryfrom time to time to save the scruples or the faceof the President.

So far as possible, therefore, it was the policy ofFrance to set the clock back and to undo what, since1870, the progress of Germany bad accomplished.By loss of territory and other measures her popula-tion was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economicsystem, upon which she depended for her newstrength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, andtransport, must be destroyed. If France could seize,even in part, what Germany was compelled to drop,the inequality of strength between the two rivals forEuropean hegemony might be remedied for manygenerations.