Ill

THE CONFERENCE

4i

rare exact moments for decisive action. And forthat the President was far too slow - minded andbewildered.

He did not remedy these defects by seeking aidfrom the collective wisdom of his lieutenants. Hehad gathered round him for the economic chapters ofthe Treaty a very able group of business men ; but theywere inexperienced in public affairs, and knew (withone or two exceptions) as little of Europe as he did,and they were only called in irregularly as hemight need them for a particular purpose. Thusthe aloofness which had been found effective inWashington was maintained, and the abnormalreserve of his nature did not allow near him anyone who aspired to moral equality or the continuousexercise of influence. His fellow-plenipotentiarieswere dummies ; and even the trusted Colonel House ,with vastly more knowledge of men and of Europe than the President, from whose sensitiveness thePresident's dulness had gained so much, fell into thebackground as time went on. All this was encouragedby his colleagues on the Council of Four, who, by thebreak-up of the Council of Ten, completed the isola-tion which the President's own temperament hadinitiated. Thus day after day and week after week,he allowed himself to be closeted, unsupported, un-advised, and alone, with men much sharper thanhimself, in situations of supreme difficulty, where heneeded for success every description of resource,