Ill

THE CONFERENCE

43

colleague, as the case might be, of which he wasincapable of securing the surrender by the methodsof secret diplomacy. What then was he to do inthe last resort ? He could let the Conference drag onan endless length by the exercise of sheer obstinacy.He could break it up and return to America in arage with nothing settled. Or he could attempt anappeal to the world over the heads of the Conference.These were wretched alternatives, against each ofwhich a great deal could be said. They were alsovery risky,—especially for a politician. The Presi-dent's mistaken policy over the Congressional electionhad weakened his personal position in his owncountry, and it was by no means certain that theAmerican public would support him in a positionof intransigeancy. It would mean a campaign inwhich the issues would be clouded by every sort ofpersonal and party consideration, and who could sayif right would triumph in a struggle which wouldcertainly not be decided on its merits. Besides, anyopen rupture with his colleagues would certainlybring upon his head the blind passions of " anti-German " resentment with which the public of allallied countries were still inspired. They would notlisten to his arguments. They would not be coolenough to treat the issue as one of internationalmorality or of the right governance of Europe . Thecry would simply be that for various sinister andselfish reasons, the President wished " to let the Hun