86 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE ch.

nearly desperate ; 1 and France and Italy, entering thescramble with certain Treaty rights, will not lightlysurrender them.

As is generally the case in real dilemmas, theFrench and Italian case will possess great force, indeedunanswerable force from a certain point of view. Theposition will be truly represented as a questionbetween German industry on the one hand and Frenchand Italian industry on the other. It may beadmitted that the surrender of the coal will destroyGerman industry; but it may be equally true thatits non-surrender will jeopardise French and Italian industry. In such a case must not the victors withtheir Treaty rights prevail, especially when much ofthe damage has been ultimately due to the wickedacts of those who are now defeated ? Yet if thesefeelings and these rights are allowed to prevail beyondwhat wisdom would recommend, the reactions on thesocial and economic life of Central Europe will befar too strong to be confined within their originallimits.

But this is not yet the whole problem. If France and Italy are to make good their own deficienciesin coal from the output of Germany, then NorthernEurope, Switzerland, and Austria, which previously

1 Mr. Hoover, in July 1919, estimated that the coal output of Europe, excluding Russia and the Balkans, had dropped from 679,500,000 tons to443,000,000 tons,—as a result in a minor degree of loss of material andlabour, but owing chiefly to a relaxation of physical effort after theprivations and sufferings of the war, a lack of rolling-stock and transport,and the unsettled political fate of some of the mining districts.