IV

THE TREATY

S 9

industrial future of Europe is black and the prospectsof revolution very good. It is a case where particularinterests and particular claims, however well foundedin sentiment or in justice, must yield to sovereignexpediency. If there is any approximate truthin Mr. Hoover's calculation that the coal outputof Europe has fallen by one-third, a situation con-fronts us where distribution must be effected witheven-handed impartiality in accordance with need,and no incentive can be neglected towards increasedproduction and economical methods of transport.The establishment by the Supreme Council of theAllies in August 1919, of a European Coal Com-mission, consisting of delegates from Great Britain ,France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia was a wise measure which, properly employed and ex-tended, may prove of great assistance. But I reserveconstructive proposals for Chapter VII. Here I amonly concerned with tracing the consequences, perimpossibile, of carrying out the Treaty an pied dela lettre. 1

(2) The provisions relating to iron-ore require less

1 As early as September 1, 1919, the Coal Commission had to face thephysical impracticability of enforcing the demands of the Treaty, and agreedto modify them as follows :—" Germany shall in the next six months makedeliveries corresponding to an annual delivery of 20 million tons as comparedwith 43 millions as provided in the Peace Treaty. If Germany' s total pro-duction exceeds the present level of about 108 millions a year, 60 per centof the extra production, up to 128 millions, shall bo delivered to the Entente,and 50 per cent of any extra beyond that, until the figure provided in thePeace Treaty is reached. If the total production falls below 108 millionsthe Entente will examine the situation, after hearing Germany, and takeaccount of it."