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REPARATION

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pating and which probably could not be secured inany case. The French, I think, never quite acceptedthis point of view; but it was certainly the British attitude ; and in this atmosphere the pre-Armisticeconditions were framed.

A month later the atmosphere had changed com-pletely. We had discovered how hopeless theGerman position really was, a discovery whichsome, though not all, had anticipated, but whichno one had dared reckon on as a certainty. Itwas evident that w T e could have secured uncondi-tional surrender if we had determined to get it.

But there was another new factor in the situationwhich was of greater local importance. The British Prime Minister had perceived that the conclusionof hostilities might soon bring with it the break-upof the political bloc upon which he was dependingfor his personal ascendency, and that the domesticdifficulties which would be attendant on demobilisa-tion, the turn-over of industry from war to peaceconditions, the financial situation, and the generalpsychological reactions of men's minds, would providehis enemies with powerful weapons, if he were toleave them time to mature. The best chance, there-fore, of consolidating his power, which was personaland exercised, as such, independently of party orprinciple, to an extent unusual in British politics,evidently lay in active hostilities before the prestigeof victory had abated, and in an attempt to found