138 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE ch.

reason on the subject of the German Indemnity ,unless one could at the same time point out tothem some alternative mode of escape from theirtroubles. 1 The representatives of the United States were greatly at fault, in my judgment, for havingno constructive proposals whatever to offer to asuffering and distracted Europe.

It is worth while to point out in passing a furtherelement in the situation, namely, the oppositionwhich existed between the "crushing" policy of M.Clemenceau and the financial necessities of M. Klotz.Clemenceau's aim was to weaken and destroy Germany in every possible way, and I fancy that he was alwaysa little contemptuous about the Indemnity ; he hadno intention of leaving Germany in a position topractise a vast commercial activity. But he did nottrouble his head to understand either the Indemnityor poor M. Klotz's overwhelming financial difficulties.If it amused the financiers to put into the Treatysome very large demands, well there was no harmin that; but the satisfaction of these demands mustnot be allowed to interfere with the essential require-ments of a Carthaginian Peace. The combination ofthe " real " policy of M. Clemenceau on unreal issues,with M. Klotz's policy of pretence on what were

1 In conversation with Frenchmen who were private persons and quiteunaffected by political considerations, this aspect became very clear. Youmight persuade them that some current estimates as to the amount to be gotout of Germany were quite fantastic. Yet at the end they would alwayscome back to where they had started : <£ But Germany must pay; for, other-wise, what is to happen to France ?"