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The economic consequences of the peace / by John Maynard Keynes
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exports and saleable foreign securities had beenavailable to a sufficient value, they could not beliquidated in time, and that the financial exhaustionof Germany was so complete that nothing whateverwas immediately available in substantial amounts ex-cept the gold in the Reichsbank. Accordingly a sumexceeding £50,000,000 in all out of the Reichsbankgold was transferred by Germany to the Allies (chieflyto the United States, Great Britain , however, alsoreceiving a substantial sum) during the first sixmonths of 1919 in payment for foodstuffs.

But this was not all. Although Germany agreed,under the first extension of the Armistice, not toexport gold without Allied permission, this permissioncould not be always withheld. There were liabilitiesof the Reichsbank accruing in the neighbouringneutral countries, which could not be met otherwisethan in gold. The failure of the Reichsbank to meetits liabilities would have caused a depreciation ofthe exchange so injurious to Germany 's credit as toreact on the future prospects of Reparation. Insome cases, therefore, permission to export goldwas accorded to the Reichsbank by the SupremeEconomic Council of the Allies .

The net result of these various measures was toreduce the gold reserve of the Reichsbank by morethan half, the figures falling from £115,000,000 to£55,000,0'00 in September 1919.

It would be possible under the Treaty to take the