164 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE ch.

probably exaggerated. But throughout the war andparticularly in its later stages, when her exchangeswere weak and her credit in the neighbouring neutralcountries was becoming very low, she was dispos-ing of such securities as Holland, Switzerland , andScandinavia would buy or would accept as collateral.It is reasonably certain that by June 1919 herinvestments in these countries had been reduced toa negligible figure and were far exceeded by herliabilities in them, Germany has also sold certainoverseas securities, such as Argentine cedulas, forwhich a market could be found.

(iv.) It is certain that since the Armistice therehas been a great flight abroad of the foreign securitiesstill remaining in private hands. This is exceedinglydifficult to prevent. German foreign investmentsare as a rule in the form of bearer securities and arenot registered. They are easily smuggled. abroadacross Germany 's extensive land frontiers, and forsome months before the conclusion of peace it wascertain that their owners would not be allowed toretain them if the Allied Governments could dis-cover any method of getting hold of them. Thesefactors combined to stimulate human ingenuity,and the efforts both of the Allied and of theGerman Governments to interfere effectively withthe outflow are believed to have been largelyfutile.

In face of all these considerations, it will be a