n FROM THE TREATY TO CONFERENCE OF LONDON 37

sympathised with M. Briand's standpoint. But wouldM. Briand ?

In this atmosphere the Conference met, and, con-sidering all the circumstances, including the pastcommitments of the principals, the result was, on thewhole, a victory for good sense, not least because theAllies there decided to return to the pathway oflegality within the ambit of the Treaty . The newproposals, concerted at this Conference, were, whetherthey were practicable or not in execution, a lawfuldevelopment of the Treaty , and in this respect sharplydistinguished from the Decisions of Paris in theJanuary preceding. However bad the Treaty mightbe, the London scheme provided a way of escapefrom a policy worse even than that of the Treaty, —acts, that is, of arbitrary lawlessness based on themere possession of superior force.

In one respect the Second Ultimatum of Londonwas lawless ; for it included an illegal threat to occupythe Ruhr Valley if Germany refused its terms. Butthis was for the sake of M. Briand, whose minimumrequirement was that he should at least be able to gohome in a position to use, for conversational purposes,the charms of the precipice from which he was hurry-ing away. And the Ultimatum made no demand onGermany to which she was not already committed byher signature to the Treaty .

For this reason the German Govermnent was right,in my judgement, to accept the Ultimatum unqualified,