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THE MARK EXCHANGE

97

and of the Stock Exchange boom based on thedepreciating mark may lead to a financial cata-strophe. 1 Those responsible for the financial policyof Germany have a problem of incomparable difficultyin front of them. Until the Eeparation liability hasbeen settled reasonably, it is scarcely worth the whileof any one to trouble his head about a problem whichis insoluble. When stabilisation has become a prac-ticable policy, the wisest course will probably be tostabilise at whatever level prices and trade seem mostnearly adjusted to at that date.

1 Furthermore, every improvement in the value of the mark increases thereal burden of what Germany owes to foreign holders of marks and also thereal burden of the Public Debt on the Exchequer. A rate of exchange exceed-ing 1000 marks to the £ has at least this advantage that it has reduced thesetwo burdens to very moderate dimensions.

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