ioo A REVISION OF THE TREATY chap.

with (3) here and in Chapter V. with (4). These latterare still important. For, whilst time is so dealing with(1) and (2) that very few people now dispute them, theamount of our legitimate claim against Germany hasnot been brought into so sharp a focus by the pressureof events. Yet if my contention about this can besubstantiated, the world will find it easier to arrangea practical settlement. The claims of justice in thisconnection are generally thought to be opposed tothose of possibility, so that even if the pressure ofevents drives us reluctantly to admit that the lattermust prevail, the former will rest unsatisfied. If,on the other hand, restricting ourselves to the devas-tations in France and Belgium , we can demonstratethat it is within the capacity of Germany to makefull reparation, a harmony of sentiment and actioncan be established.

With this end in view it is necessary that I shouldtake up again, in the light of the fuller informationnow available, the statements which I made in TheEconomic Consequences of the Peace (p. 110) to theeffect that " the amount of the material damage donein the invaded districts has been the subject ofenormous, if natural, exaggeration." These state-ments have involved me in a charge, with whichFrenchmen as eminent as M. Clemenceau 1 and M.

1 It is of these passages that M. Clemenceau wrote as follows in hispreface to M. Tardieu's book: " Fort en theme d'economiste, M. Keynes (qui ne fut pas seul, dans la Conference, a professer cette opinion) combat,sans aucun management, ' Tabus des exigences des Allies ' (lisez : ' de la