vii THE SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE 185

This would be a just, sensible, and permanentsettlement. If France were to refuse it, she wouldindeed be sacrificing the substance to the shadow.In spite of superficial appearances to the contrary, itis also in the self-interest of Great Britain . PerhapsBritish public opinion, profoundly altered though itnow is, may not yet be reconciled to obtaining nothing.But this is a case where a wise nation will do bestby acting in a large way. I have not neglected toconsider with care the various possible devices bywhich Great Britain might get, or appear to get,something for herself from the settlement. Shemight take, for instance, in satisfaction of her claimssome of the C Bonds under the London Settlement,which, having a third priority after provision for theA and B Bonds , can be given a nominal value butare really worth nothing. She might, in lieu ofreceiving a share of the proceeds of the German customs, stipulate that her goods should be admittedinto Germany free of duty. She might seek a partialcontrol over German industries, or obtain the servicesof German organisation for the future exploitationof Bussia. Plans of this sort attract an ingeniousmind and are not to be discarded too hastily. YetI prefer the simple plan, and I believe that all thesedevices are contrary to true wisdom.

There is a disposition in some quarters to insistthat any concessions to France by Great Britain andthe United States , affecting Reparation and Inter-