S 4 THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE CH.

to be exported to the Allies , there remain 60,000,000tons for Germany herself to meet her own domesticconsumption. Demand as well as supply will be dimin-ished by loss of territory, but at the most extravagantestimate this could not be put above 29,000,000 tons. 1Our hypothetical calculations, therefore, leave us withpost-war German domestic requirements, on the basisof a pre-war efficiency of railways and industry, of110,000,000 tons against an output not exceeding100,000,000 tons, of which 40,000,000 tons aremortgaged to the Allies .

The importance of the subject has led me into asomewhat lengthy statistical analysis. It is evidentthat too much significance must not be attached tothe precise figures arrived at, which are hypotheticaland dubious. 2 But the general character of the factspresents itself irresistibly. Allowing for the loss ofterritory and the loss of efficiency, Germany cannotexport coal in the near future (and will even bedependent on her Treaty rights to purchase in UpperSilesia) , if she is to continue as an industrial nation.

1 This supposes a loss of 25 per cent of Germany 's industrial under-takings and a diminution of 13 per cent in her other requirements.

2 The reader must be reminded in particular that the above calculationstake no account of the German production of lignite, which yielded in 191313,000,000 tons of rough lignite in addition to an amount converted into21,000,000 tons of briquette. This amount of lignite, however, wasrequired in Germany before the war in addition to the quantities of coalassumed above. I am not competent to speak on the extent to which theloss of coal can be made good by the extended use of lignite or by economiesin its present employment ; but some authorities believe that Germany mayobtain substantial compensation for her loss of coal by paying more attentionto her deposits of lignite.