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THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL

[JUNE

which does not begin to fall due for nearly six years, and thecalculation assumes loans of $3,175 million on the American market through the International Bank, which will take somedoing.

In addition to the interest payment, there is the annualamortisation of capital. The British credit is spread over fiftyyears, the Export-Import Bank and other Lend-Lease creditsover twenty to thirty years. But it is easiest to assume, whatis not unreasonable, that new American loans hereafter will beat least equal to the annual amortisation payments. If not, ofcourse the aggregate interest payments will, after a time, fall offappreciably. In their statement of Foreign Loan Policy of theUnited States Government published on February 21, 1946, theNational Advisory Council on International Monetary andFinancial Problems assert that the annual interest and amortisa-tion on the entire present and contemplated Export-Import Bankprogramme (that is, presumably, including the proposed additional$1-25 billion), the British Loan and the International Bank Loansfloated in U.S. markets would be less than $1 billion.

There are far too many uncertainties in the position to allowof any clear-cut summing up. I am content to leave the readerto reach his own tentative conclusion in the light of the above.Very broadly, however, it looks as if the invisible balance of theUnited States on current account, including interest, is morelikely to be adverse than favourable, and, if tourist traffic fulfilsexpectations, substantially adverse. For visible trade to assumean excess of exports over imports by as much as $2 to $3 billionas an average over a period of years allows, from the point ofview of the outside world, a considerable, one should hope anexcessive, measure of pessimism. If American Commercial Policyis successful in directing itself with any degree of conviction tothe preservation of equilibrium in the overall balance of pay-ments, the final outcome might be appreciably better than theabove-It may be worth while to record the experience of theUnited States after the last war. The U.S. balance of paymentsfrom 1924 to 1930 inclusive showed a merchandise excess of almost$800 million a year on the average. But shipping and travellingexpenditure cut the above favourable balance almost in halfwhilst cash remittances from the United States (no longer re-latively so important to-day) almost eliminated the remainder;with the result that the next annual balance on capital accountwas not more than $100 million.