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"Government that would entail an unconditional engage-ment on their part to support Russia and France by"force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were"nil and a war on behalf of that country would never be"sanctioned by British public opinion."It is not fully known in what frame of mind the French Ambassador received M. Sazonof's suggestions, for the French Yellow Book, rather characteristically, contains no report on thisimportant conversation, and Sir George Buchanan contents himselfin his own report with the remark that his French colleaguegave him "to understand that France would fulfil all the obli-"gations contained in her alliance with Russia." This left thequestion of France 's neutrality in an offensive war on the partof Russia open. And indeed, as will be presently seen, it wasonly at a later stage that France gave the Russian Governmentthe promise of unconditional armed support.
We will now proceed to examine the way in which France 'sand England's attitude have developed.
Evidently the French Government found itself in a gravedilemma. First, its whole policy had for years been based uponmost intimate relations with Russia . On the other hand, theresponsibility of siding with Russia in the bad cause of Servia,the risk of being left alone with Russia, against Germany andAustria , were both heavy.
The French statesmen consequently were moved by twoapprehensions. They were afraid of rousing Russia 's suspicionand of isolating France after weakening Franco-Russian relations.And again, they were afraid of standing alone in a war withGermany, while Austria-Hungary was fighting Russia .
As a result of these apprehensions the French Governmentrefused to risk any action at St. Petersburgh which might haveallowed the interpretation that France was breaking away fromRussia. The efforts of the German Ambassador at Paris ,after the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, toattract the attention of the French Cabinet to the gravity of the