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THE ACCOMPLICES.

If the preceding explanations, based without exceptionupon documentary publications of the Entente Governments,furnish us with the proof that the leading men of Russia havewanted, and fomented, the war, the question arises how thisdecision, wrought with the most terrible responsibilities, wasactually formed.

The imperative motive of self-preservation has to be discarded,for Russia was not threatened by anybody.

The "protection of Servia" is equally illusory, for, apartfrom the fact that there existed no defensive alliance political ormoral, between Servia and Russia, Austria had pledged herselfto various Powers to respect Servia 's territorial integrity andsovereignty.

Not even the preservation of Russian prestige in the Balkans could any longer justify an appeal to arms considering the goodintentions of Austria-Hungary .

War therefore had become merely a question of opportunityfor Russia .

In the absence of really pressing reasons, the decision to goto war could only be explained by the consideration that theopportunity seemed favourable for the overthrow of those Powerssuspected to thwart the political ambitions of Russia 's leading men.

Standing by herself, Russia would, if inevitable, have embarkedin a war with Austria-Hungary and Germany for the defenceof her most vital national interests, but never would she have doneso for the probability of success. Nothing but the convictionof active co-operation by other Powers could have promptedRussia 's fateful decision. Therefore, the attitude of the two otherPowers of the Triple Entente was bound to exert a decisiveinfluence upon her.

The co-operation of France , not to speak of England, was byno means a foregone conclusion. The Franco-Russian treaty didnot bind France unconditionally to join in the struggle, andno precise arrangements of any kind existed between Russia