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"the effect that we can count entirely upon France 's support as"our ally" ("d'exprimer au Gouvernement français notre sincèrereconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de Francem'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compterentièrement sur l'appui de notre alliée la France" ). In the presentcircumstances, M. Sazonof added, this declaration is particularlyvaluable to us. ("Dans les circonstances actuelles cette déclarationnous est particulièrement précieuse.")

It results that France has in the evening of the 29 thof July, neither sooner nor later, given to Russia theexplicit and unconditional promise of armed support.

Why not earlier? And why could France definitely arrive atthis momentous decision on the 29 th of July?

The key to this lies by

ENGLAND.

Since 1905, France 's relations with England are officially called"Entente Cordiale". An entente , not an alliance. In the EnglishParliament the ministers responsible for the foreign policy havecontinually declared that those cordial relations represented notreaty obligations between the two nations; there was no bindingobligation on the part of England, and the free decision ofParliament was in no way interfered with.

To-day we know better.

Between Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State forForeign Affairs, and M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador of the FrenchRepublic at the Court of St. James', letters were exchanged on the22nd and 23«• of November, 1912, of which Sir Edward Grey 'sletter - confirmed by M. Paul Cambon on the 23 rd of Novemberin similar terms - is here reproduced (Blue Book No. 105,Enclosure 1):

"Foreign Office, November 22, 1912."My Dear Ambassador,"From time to time in recent years the French and"British naval and military experts have consulted together."It has always been understood that such consultation"does not restrict the freedom of either Government to