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"decide at any future time whether or not to assist thewother by armed force. We have agreed that consultation"between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded"as, an engagement that commits either Government to"action in a contingency that has not arisen and may"never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the"French and British fleets respectively at the present"moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate"in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either"Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked"attack by a third Power, it might become essential to"know whether it could in that event depend upon the"armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason"to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or"something that threatened the general peace, it should"immediately discuss with the other whether both"Governments should act together to prevent aggression"and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they"would be prepared to take in common. If these"measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs"would at once be taken into consideration, and the"Governments would then decide what effect should be"given to them.

Yours, &c, E. GREY."

This historical document confirms that the English and French naval and military authorities had for years past worked out,and agreed upon, plans for a joint action on sea and on land.There is no doubt against whom those plans were directed.They were regulated by repeated consultations which took place atregular intervals between the English and French military and navalauthorities. The conditions upon which joint action of the twomilitary and naval forces was to become effective were not thenformulated; it was to be eventually decided whether such jointaction should be taken or not.