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"thing that was on my mind. The situation was very"grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present"actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it."But if Germany became involved in it, and then France ,"the issue might be so great that it would involve all"European interests; and I did not wish him to be"misled by the friendly tone of our conversation"-which I hoped would continue - into thinking that"we should stand aside."

The plainness of this statement left nothing to be desired.

Now, outspokenness can be an advantage in grave situationsand it can also be useful for clearing them. But if suchwas Sir Edward Grey's intention, for what earthly reason didhe tell the French Ambassador in the morning of July 29 th thathe was going to see the German Ambassador and that he wouldmake that "quite private and friendly" communication to him?

Sir Edward Grey himself reports to the English Ambassadorat Paris that he has proceeded in this way (Blue Book No. 87):"After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the"situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to"tell the German Ambassador to-day that he"must not be misled by the friendly tone of our"conversations into any sense of false security"that we should stand aside if all the efforts to"preserve the peace, which we were now making"in common with Germany , failed."

France could now be absolutely sure of active armed supportby England in the event of her being dragged into theconflict by the force of circumstances. It is significant that theFrench Yellow Book contains no trace of a report by PaulCambon concerning this conversation, the most highly impor-tant one of all during the entire critical week. And theYellow Book will be also vainly searched for the instructionswhich were thereupon hurried from Paris to St. Petersburgh. Butthe bullet which had left the barrel in London in the morning ofJuly 29 th , hit the mark at St. Petersburgh on the same evening: