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frontier*). With the perspicacity peculiarly his own, M. Cainbonanticipated that Germany would now attack France , be it by thedemand that she should cease her war preparations or that sheshould engage to remain neutral in the event of a war breaking-out between Germany and Russia. Both of these, France wouldhave to decline (Blue Book No. 105).
Thus, a threatening^ attack on France and the menacingof the peace of Europe, the two premises upon which adecision was at once to be taken as to the pre-arranged co-operation of the English and French armies and navies becomingeffective, had now set in, at least in the interpretation of theFrench Government. The ultimate decision of the English Cabinetcould no longer be doubtful after the conversation which had takenplace between Grey and Cambon on July 29 th .
Was Sir Edward Grey aware that on that very 29 th of JulyFrance had promised Russia unconditional armed support, a pro-mise upon which Russia had immediately determined to face the risksof war? If so, did he see but the ghost of a chance for theinstruction which he telegraphed to Buchanan on the 30 th of Julytelling him to urgently recommend to the Russian Government theacceptance of the new proposal of mediation which had resulted fromhis conversation with the German Ambassador? If Sir Edward Grey really aimed at bringing about a conciliation on this basis in theeleventh hour, and if he was sincere in welcoming Count Berch-told's concession — due to the German Emperor's intervention —to discuss with Russia the material points of the note to Servia,what must his feelings have been when the Russian Governmentordered general mobilisation on the 31 st of July? War had becomeinevitable, the war into which, considering all that had happenedbefore, England, too, was bound to be dragged? Was it reallySir Edward Grey's wish that Russia should proceed in this way,regardless of the prospects of a pacific settlement, regardless alsoof his own suggestion?