- 51 -
which, in the short space between the 24 th of July and 4 th ofAugust, have fomented this greatest and most sanguinary of allwars. These single events and actions, the utterances of SirEdward Grey, of Cambon and Sazonof, of the First Lord of theAdmiralty and of the Russian Generalissimo all these mani-festations small as they may appear in comparison to the appallinghuman tragedy, are only the sudden outcome of the mysteriousForces which determine the History of our days.
In the case of Russia it is the craving for supremacy in the NearEast, increased in vigour since her defeat at the hands of Japan, the grim determination to break through any resistance on thepart of the Central Powers, whenever it should be possible.
As regards France, it is the fatal direction of her entirepolicy towards the negative pole of her thirst for revenge, coupledwith dread, and converging in the readiness to side with anypowerful adversary of Germany.
With England it is the commercial envy and aversionagainst any ascendant economical system, added to the instinctiveantagonism against the strongest continental Power, and thetraditional suppression of any continental aspiration to sea power.
These heterogeneous forces have spun the network of theEntente which became a terrible instrument in the hands of asmall minority bent upon war, and in whose meshes the largeand peaceful majority of the people of Russia, France and Englandwere hopelessly taken. Russia's conflict with Austria-Hungary subjected the Entente to the supreme test. There is no doubt thata single word on the part of France would have been sufficientto keep down the Russian war party. At any rate, it is mostprobable that such a word, if spoken by England, would havekept back France. But it is on the other hand obvious that thesmallest sign of encouragement by England was bound to let thewar parties in Russia and France gain the upper-hand. It is ofcourse equally certain that any withdrawal of France and Englandwould have broken up the Triple Entente even if treaties andagreements would, so to speak, have allowed these two Powersa free hand. A novel orientation of the entire European policy
4*