- 5 -

army and navy which had been ordered by the Czar in theearly morning of the 31 st of July, and Russia 's refusal tocountermand that step, as Germany had requested.

It is important to state that the Russian Government had noreason to entertain the slightest doubt that the order of a generalmobilisation in Russia, and the maintenance of this measure, werebound to make war with Germany inevitable. Officially as wellas inofficially the Russian Government was earnestly and in timegiven to understand that a general mobilisation on the part ofRussia would be tantamount to the German mobilisation, andfurther, that the latter was identical with war.*)

The reasons are as evident as they are convincing. Germany could not possibly, in view of the imminent danger of a war ontwo fronts, relinquish the start which the more rapid mobilisationof her own forces secured for her as soon as the situation wouldreach the critical point of a general mobilisation by Russia. Forimperative reasons of self-preservation Germany could not fora moment accept the idea that a mobilisation on both sides wasto be followed by a temporising attitude.

That this view was admitted as evident even by the Allies is shown by the telegram of Sir George Buchanan, BritishAmbassador at St. Petersburgh , of July 25 th (see Blue Book No. 17).Buchanan reports on a conversation with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"I said all I could to impress prudence on the"Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if"Russia mobilised, Germany would not be con-sent with mere mobilisation, or give Russia "time to carry out hers, but would probably"declare war at once."

*) According to the German White Book, the German Ambassadorat St. Petersburgh was instructed on the 26 th of July to make the followingstatement to the Russian Government:

"preparatory military measures on the part of Russia will force us"to take counter-measures which must consist in the mobilisation of the"army. But mobilisation means war."