- 6 -

In the eleventh hour the German Emperor has in histelegram of the 30 <h of July, 1 o'clock a. m., personally pointedout to the Czar "the dangers and serious consequences of a"mobilisation".

There could not have remained uncertainty in the minds ofthe Russian Government and of the Czar that, when they issuedthe order for the general mobilisation on the 31 st of July, warwas meant.

And, while this accounts for the immediate outbreak ofwar, the question arises as to the reasons which haveprompted the general Russian mobilisation.

It is but fair to those on whose shoulders rests the respons-ibility for the decision, that we should examine the reasons whichthey themselves are advancing.

Let us first hear the Czar.

In his telegram to the German Emperor of the 30 th of July,1.20 o'clock p. m., there is not yet any allusion made to theimpending general mobilisation; it contains merely a referenceto the preparative measures directed against Austria :

"The military measures now being put in force were

"decided upon 5 days ago, for reasons of defence

"against the preparations of Austria ."This telegram had crossed the German Emperor's messagementioned above, which drew the Czar 's attention to the seriousconsequences of a Russian mobilisation, and which furtherexpressed the fear that a mobilisation, even if solely directedagainst Austria , would threaten, if it did not make actuallyimpossible, the part of the mediator which the German Emperorhad accepted upon the Czar's express desire. The Czar repliedon the 31 st of July, at 2 o'clock p. m., after the order forthe general mobilisation of the whole of the Russian forces had already been issued:

"It is technically impossible to stop our military

"preparations which have been necessitated by Austria 's

"mobilisation."

There are two possibilities: If the expression "our military pre-parations" meant but a partial mobilisation against Austria , the